Delivered. Why, when a major crisis arises, are policies that have hitherto been considered unthinkable or impossible are implemented? While other reforms, however deemed essential by their promoters, are not? It is to these questions that the articles of this fascinating collective work attempt to answer by taking the case of the period which, from 2008 to 2011, saw the world financial system pass very close to collapse and the euro zone threatened. erupted by the debt crisis. But these lessons also concern the pandemic that the entire planet is currently facing …
Crisis analysis is a classic exercise in political or economic science. Researchers are classically divided between the proponents of “Maintenance of the status quo” lampédusien (“Everything changes so that nothing changes”), and those of “Paradigm shift” that shock allows. The authors propose to go beyond this alternative by focusing on the balance of power, intellectual and institutional, between the different social groups responsible for “Piloting” of the crisis – political leaders, parliamentarians, senior officials, bureaucrats and technocrats, lobbies, unions, experts of all stripes, at national level and, increasingly, at European and international level – and this is, moreover, a major novelties of this crisis.
New institutional arrangements
So that there is change – such as for example the switch of the European Central Bank in the massive buyout of liquidity, contrary to all the previous dogmas, or the establishment of a control of the large systemic banks (until the nationalization in the British case), despite the unbridled lobbying of the said banks – indeed, a political-academic-institutional coalition must take shape in order to adopt measures that have hitherto remained on the books of aborted projects or in academic journals. Most of the reforms adopted actually come from “Dynamics of change” well before the crisis, but that it unblocks suddenly, sometimes (but not always) in favor of political alternations.
This also requires that the crisis lasts long enough and is serious enough to allow time and opportunity for these coalitions to form and triumph before the natural returns at a gallop. And rather than the result of a confrontation between “revolutionaries”, the bearers of a new world and stiff-necked supporters of the conservative order, “change” is rather a compromise, the effects of which are no less real, although their reflection in public discourse oscillates between the accusation of “all that for that” and the relief of having resisted the delusions of disheveled Utopians.
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